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Notes
Acceleration Clause Disclosure: A Truth in Lending
Policy Analysis
Acceleration clauses in consumer credit contracts are provisions "by which
the time for payment of the debt is hastened or advanced because of the
breach of some condition of the contract by the debtor."' Under the Uniform
Commercial Code the creditor may accelerate payment upon the debtor's
default 2 of some contract provision or when the debtor feels "insecure."' Such
clauses are also used in transactions where the creditor takes a security in-
terest in goods in the debtor's possession. 4 Acceleration after default is essen-
tial as a remedial action for the creditor; otherwise he would have to sue for
each installment of the contract as it becomes due after the initial default. 5
Acceleration is significant because it is very widely used. 6 A survey
prepared for the National Commission on Consumer Finance (NCCF), in-
dicates that 80 to 85% of the surveyed banks use the acceleration clause in a
majority of their consumer credit contracts.7 The survey also reveals that
finance companies use of the acceleration clause exceeds even the usage by
banks; 90% of all the finance companies responding in the survey use the ac-
celeration clause in a majority of their credit contracts8 and also invoke the
clause in a large percentage of their legal proceedings.9 The NCCF study con-
cludes that "acceleration is highly valued by a clear majority of lenders of
every kind and that they use it quite extensively.' u0
The major problem with the acceleration clause is that it can "result in
an unexpected burden to the borrower."" Although debtors know they
ultimately must pay, they often do not realize that delay beyond the grace
'BLAcK's LAW DiCTONARY 26 (rev. 4th ed., 1968).
2U.C.C. § 9-505 (1972).
3U.C.C. § 1-208 (1972).
,U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972).
55 National Commission on Consumer Finance, Technical Studies at 20 [hereinafter cited
as NCCF Studies].
OSee generally 5 NCCF Studies, supra note 5, at 29-41. Acceleration is also important
because it quite often is the first of many remedies that the creditor invokes. Subsequent or con-
current collection sanctions and credit or remedies include: required payments of creditors' at-
torney fees by defaulting debtor, confessions of judgment (cognovit notes), repossession, deficien-
cy judgments, garnishment, wage assignments, and levy on personal property.
71d. at 37.
'Id. at 39.
'With respect to auto indirect credit, for instance, 75% of the time the acceleration clause
is used to collect in formal legal action; and with respect to personal loans it is 71%. Id. at 33.
Id. at 41.
"Clausen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 423 F. Supp. 985, 988 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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period for a particular payment can result in an enforceable demand for pay-
ment of all remaining installments. Obviously a consumer who cannot meet a
single installment will be unable to bear the burden of paying the entire
balance immediately. Disclosure on the contract itself may come too late, as
few consumers read the contract after signing it and even fewer read, or even
obtain, the contract before signing.
Although nearly all consumer installment contracts contain an accelera-
tion clause, 2 until recently creditors did not include this clause on the
disclosure statement required by the Truth in Lending Act (TIL Act).13 In
1968, Congress enacted the TIL Act expressly to "assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use
of credit."1 4 The Act does not regulate the substantive terms of credit exten-
sion, rather it is an informational disclosure law. Both the Act and Regula-
tion Z,15 promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to implement the
Act, require disclosure of only specific credit terms. The TIL Act requires
disclosure of the "default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the
event of late payment."18 Regulation Z provides that the creditor must
disclose "the amount, or method of computing the amount, of any default,
delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments."1 7
Recent litigation has centered on the issue of whether the acceleration
clause is one of those required disclosures within the language of Regulation
Z and the Act. The great weight of authority is that, when unearned interest
is not rebated to the consumer upon acceleration, 18 this interest amounts to a
"charge," and the acceleration clause must be disclosed.1 9 However, the
district courts are split as to whether there must be disclosure of the accelera-
tion clause even when the creditor is required by state law to rebate the total
unearned portion of the finance charge.20 The FRB issued an Official Inter-
"2See generally 5 NCCF Studies, supra note 5, at 29-33.
"15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (1970).
1415 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
"512 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.13 (1977).
1615 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (1970).
112 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977).
"Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972); McDaniel v.
Fulton Nat'l Banks, 395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Barret v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., 395 P.
Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
"gHewson, Acceleration Clauses in Georgia: Consumer Installment Contracts and the
Federal Truth in Lending Act, 27 MERCER L. RIv. 969, 976 (1976).
2"This split in authority was cleared up, to some degree, by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Johnson v. McCrachan Sturman Ford, 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975), which held that the
phrase "default, delinquency, and similar charges" does not mandate disclosure if all the unearn-
ed portion of the finance charge is rebated upon acceleration. See generally Note, The Accelera-
tion Clause: A Truth in Lending Anomoly? 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 593 (1976). Some courts accepted
a broad interpretation of the word "charge," concluding that whether or not the unearned portion
of the finance charge was rebated, the acceleration clause does result in an often unexpected
burden on the borrower. This revised timing of loan repayment, i.e., immediate payment of all
principal when an installment is late, constitutes an "obligation, claim or burden" as charge is
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pretationzl in March of 1977 stating that the right of acceleration is not a
charge, at least when interest is rebated, because it is conditional rather than
automatic. 22 FRB Official Interpretations are given conclusive effect by Con-
gress23 and therefore are given the same deference as Regulation Z by the
courts, so that it is unlikely that acceleration clause disclosure will be re-
quired within the context of the TIL Act in the future. In addition, there are
currently several reform and/or simplification bills in Congress which could
resolve the disclosure issue differently, 24 and the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs25 will shortly produce its own version of a
TIL reform act; in their present form, however, the proposed bills2 6 do not
require disclosure of the acceleration clause.
It has been suggested 27 that the explanation for consumer-oriented law
should be found in microeconomic rather than socio-political theory. This
note will focus on the various policies behind the TIL Act, identify the
microeconomic goals of those policies, and examine whether disclosure of the
acceleration clause should be required in order to further the policies and
associated economic goals of the TIL Act.
defined in BLAcK's LAW DIcrIONARY. This broad interpretation, it was reasoned, is in line with
the liberal construction that has been traditionally given to the TIL Act in order to effectuate
the policy of informed use of credit. Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore.
1975); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974); Garza v.
Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Burley v. Bastrap Loan Co., Inc.,
407 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. La. 1976). Clausen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 423 F. Supp. 985 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). Other courts have narrowly construed the phrasing of the regulation. Their reasoning
is that TIL's purpose is to provide a system of remedies tht reflects commercial reality. Since this
is a series of disclosure requirements imposed on creditors, Congress meant to ascribe to these
terms their meaning in the credit industry. In the commercial context, default charges refer to
specific pecuniary sums that are assessed against the borrower solely because of his failure to
make timely payment. Since the unearned finance charge is rebated upon acceleration, there is
no additional sum or charge paid by the borrower. The fact that immediate payment is burden-
some, does not necessarily make the right of acceleration a default charge; rather it is accurately
viewed as a future right or remedy, and not a default charge. Barnet v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc.,
395 F. Supp. 904 (N.D'. Ga. 1975); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Banks, 395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga.
1974).
2,12 C.F.R. § 226.101.
22The explantion for the FRB position is vague and unsatisfactory. See Federal Reserve
Board Official Staff Interpretations No. FC-0054, 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) § 31,552 (Mar.
21, 1977).
2315 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (Supp. IV 1974).
24S. 1312, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1501, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
25S.1312 ind S. 1501, supra note 24, were each referred to the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs.
29S. 1312, supra note 24, p. 7, lines 13-20, would re-word the TIL Act to accord with the
FR Official Interpretation, supra note 22. S. 1501 supra note 24, p. 9, lines 16-23, would strike
the entire default charge disclosure requirement, supra note 16.
27Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs and Benefits, 27 STANFORD L. Rkv. 951, 951
(1975); Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales, 15
B.C. INDUS. AND CoM. L. REv. 499, 500 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schwartzl.
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THE POLICY IN THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
The purported objective of the TIL Act and Regulation Z is
to assure that every customer who has need for consumer credit is given
meaningful information with respect to the cost of that credit . . . [O]ther
relevant credit information must also be disclosed so that the customer may
readily compare the various credit terms available to him from different
sources and avoid the uninformed use of credit. 28
Congress was not precise in stating the goals of the Act.2 9 In fact, it has been
noted that:
It is common when discussing proposed or enacted legislation first to identify
the purpose of the legislation and then to take the measure of the legislation
in light of those purposes. We have reserved this pattern because it is much
easier to state what TIL requires than to identify its objectives. This task is
made even more difficult by the fact that the hearings held in connection
with the TIL act served ds a forum for airing a wide variety of consumer
grievances, many of which had nothing to do with the Act as finally enacted
and which TIL does not purport to resolve . . . . Moreover, the hearings
became so clouded by the lenders' insistence that APR disclosure was not
feasible and/or was inaccurrate . . . that the more basic question of the ob-
jectives of the legislation was not really addressed. 0
Nevertheless, there appear to be three primary policies behind the TIL
Act. The first policy of the Act is to disclose the costs of credit and other
specific terms of the transaction so as to create a basis for comparative shopp-
ing by the consumer among the various extenders of credit.32 The economic
goal of encouraging comparative shopping through disclosure is to promote
competition within the consumer credit industry;3 2 with creditors competing
for borrowing customers, a stable equilibrium price for credit is established.
The second policy of the TIL Act is to disclose the relevant costs and terms
essential for informed investment decisions such as whether to use cash, take
funds from savings, use credit, or defer purchase of the good or service.3 3 In
economic terms, the use of the disclosure information enables the consumer
to assert informed preferences, resulting in both optimal resource allocation
and maximum individual economic welfare. Finally, the third policy of the
212 CFR § 226.1(2) (1977.)
28Landers, Determining the Finance Charge Under The Truth in Lending Act, 1977 AM.
B. FOUNDATION REsEARcH J. 1, 53 [hereinafter cited as Landers]. Professor Jonathan M. Landers
had studied the TIL Act as a Visiting Scholar at the American Bar Foundation during 1975 and
1976. The policies discerned in this note derive primarily from his articles published as a product
of his study.
"Landers and Chandler, The Truth in Lending Act and Variable-Rate Mortgages and
Balloon Notes, 1976 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 35, 63-64.
3'Landers, supra note 29, at 49, 53, 86, 91; Landers & Chandler, supra note 30, at 60, 63.
"Consumer Credit In The United States, Report of the National Commission on Consumer
Finance at 172 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF Report].
"Landers, supra note 29, at 55; NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 172; Landers, The Scope
of Coverage of the Truth in Lending Act, 1976 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 565, 589.
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TIL Act is the general policy of increasing consumer awareness. The
economic goal of this policy, a broad concept that runs as a thread through
all consumer-oriented legislation, is to educate the consumer with respect to
the credit transaction by providing the most relevant information in a concise
statement, thereby reducing the disparity in party sophistication and
eliminating the chance for abusive creditor practices.
In examining the utility of acceleration clause disclosure within the TIL
policy context, it should be noted that characteristically, the legislative
response to the imperfections34 and inequalities8 in the consumer credit
market has been in the form of regulating the market in various ways, in-
cluding: increasing access to the market by eliminating market entry barriers;
making information available to the consumer; regulating terms and condi-
tions of the agreement; and statutorily limiting remedies. 6 Required
disclosure of the accelation clause fits comfortably within this regulatory
framework and would further the policies and economic goals of the TIL
Act.37
PROMOTING COMPARATIVE SHOPPING
The first goal of the disclosure requirements of the TIL Act is to promote
comparative shopping by consumers among creditors in the pursuit of in-
creased competition among credit extenders. The major emphasis of TIL has
been on the disclosure of information relating to the cost of credit,38 such as
annual percentage rate and total finance charges. When each component
comprising the cost of the credit to the consumer is required to be either in-
cluded in the finance charge or separately itemized and disclosed as excluded
from the finance charge,3 9 the consumer has a set of data with which he can
compare the cost of using credit from the various extenders. The consumer
must also be provided with various credit terms and conditions of the credit
transaction,40 such as "[a] description of any penalty charge that may be im-
posed by the creditor or his assignee for prepayment of the principal of the
obligation (such as a real estate mortgage) with an explanation of the method
of computation of such penalty and the conditions under which it may be im-
posed.. 4 The creditor is also required to identify "the type of any security
"Market imperfections are any restrictions which tend to inhibit the free interaction of
potential borrowers and suppliers of credit. NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 113. Inequalities in-
clude the greater economic resources, experience and acuity the creditor possesses.
5 Alderman, Imprisonment For Debt: Default Judgments, the Contempt Power and the Ef-
fectiveness of Notice Provisions in the State of New York, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1217, 1218
(1974).
56Id. at 1218-1219.
"
7See generally NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 109-114.
3812 C.F.R. § 226.1 (1977); Landers, supra note 29, at 60.
3'l2 C.F.R. § 226.4 (1977).
"012 C.F.R. §§ 226.7, 226.8 (1977).
4112 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(6) (1977).
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interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with
the extension of credit. '"4 2 The disclosure of these and other terms and condi-
tions, coupled with the finance charge disclosures, enables the consumer to
compare creditors and make an intelligent credit decision. The issue is
whether the acceleration clause disclosure will further enable the consumer to
make an intelligent credit decision and encourage comparative shopping
among creditors.
The acceleration clause was among the credit remedies and contract pro-
visions studied by the National Commission on Consumer Finance. 43
Although the study found that "acceleration is very widely used and very
favorable opinions are held by banks about its utility," 44 it was concluded
that "acceleration does not appear to be absolutely indispensable in every in-
stance of formal legal recovery.145 Although 80% of the commercial banks
surveyed included the acceleration clause within the credit contract,'46 it was
used to collect in formal legal action only 2 out of 5 times. 47 Also, of this
80%, 36% 4 8 rarely use the acceleration clause to collect,'4 9 while only 26% 50
of those who include acceleration clauses use the clause to collect in a majori-
ty of their formal legal actions.51 It thus appears that, whereas the use of ac-
celeration in the contract is extensive, the actual invoking of the clause, when
the debtor is in default and the creditor resorts to legal action, is much more
infrequent. In fact one sixth of those commercial banks who invoked the
clause less than 40% of the time found the clause unnecessary and nearly half
found acceleration only moderately useful.5 2 In a transaction between a
creditor and a debtor with a high credit rating, the low risk of default in-
dicates little need for the presence of the acceleration clause. A creditor
would likely be willing to modify the credit contract due to this risk, and
thereby gain a borrowing customer.
It can be reasoned not only that acceleration disclosure could be useful to
the debtor in distinguishing those creditors who include the clause from those
who do not, but also that consumer awareness of the presence of accelera-
tion and creditor flexibility may form grounds for bargaining for the elimina-
tion or modification of the acceleration term. Thus, particulary risk-averse
-212 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1977).
"See generally 5 NCCF Studies, supra note 5.
44Id. at 37.
4Id. at 41.
41Id. at 31.
471d.
49Id.
4936% used the clause to collect between 0% and 19% of the time in formal legal actions.
Id. at 31.
1Id. at 31.
5126% used the clause to collect between 80% and 100% of the time in formal legal ac-
tions. Id. at 31. For analogous statistics on finance companies, see text accompanying notes 8-10
supra
525 NCCF Studies, supra note 5, at 31.
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consumers may shop for a creditor who does not include the clause in the
contract, while other more assertive consumers may seek modification of the
acceleration clause-for example, a grace period longer than that employed
by the creditor.
Many consumers may be indifferent about acceleration clauses since few
debtors plan on defaulting when shopping for credit. However, even if only a
few consumers begin to base their credit shopping decisions on the accelera-
tion clause factor, extenders of credit may be encouraged to compete for
their use of credit. As Senator Douglas pointed out in the TIL congressional
hearings, "it is the undecided minority that influences the sellers. So you need
only have, in my judgment, about 10 percent cost conscious and they will get
the firms competing for that 10 percent."5' 3 Creditors are more likely to give
the consumer a better package of terms if at least some consumers are aware
of the risk acceleration poses and use this knowledge when dealing With credit
extenders. Acceleration clause disclosure would not offend the policy of en-
couraging comparative shopping, but rather would further this goal by in-
creasing the debtor's awareness of this creditor remedy, thus providing a
significant basis for distinguishing creditors.
ENCOURAGING INFORMED INVESTMENT DECISIONS
The second policy of the TIL Act is to promote informed investment
decision-making by consumers. Through required disclosure statements of
credit costs and the most relevant terms of the credit agreement, consumers
can properly evaluate the credit option in deciding whether to use credit, sav-
ings, or cash for their purchase, or whether to defer purchase of the good or
service. The consumer is thereby enabled to assert an informed purchase
preference in the market place, which is essential to the pursuit of optimal
resource allocation and maximum individual welfare, the microeconomic
goals of the second TIL policy. To illustrate the significance of information
disclosure to these economic goals, it is necessary to examine the economic
theory upon which our modified market economy is based before proceeding
to analyze the acceleration clause in the context of informed investment
decision-making by consumers.
The basic criterion for judging the performance of our economic system
is the efficiency with which business satisfies consumer demand. The enor-
mous gap between consumer demand for goods and services and the relatively
limited ability of society to produce them gives rise to the basic premise of
our modified market economy; society is forced to establish a priority system
to guide production activity. In a capitalistic economy, business firms, by vir-
tue of the profit motive, are induced to choose among the alternative uses of
"Consumer Credit Protection Bill; Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
sumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 173.
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economic resources such that the most preferred resources are pur-
chased first. When demand is great enough to provide an adequate profit,
resources are used to meet that demand. Firms producing a product or pro-
viding a service for which demand is insufficient become unprofitable, and
the price mechanism deprives them of the capital needed to obtain resources
in demand elsewhere. Thus changes in consumer preference initiate price
movements which signal producers to alter the composition of their output.
As a consequence the profit motive, in a competitive price system, functions
to provide our economy with optimal resource allocation according to the ex-
pressed preferences of the consumer.5 4
Consumer purchase decisions are not formal and abstract; when a con-
sumer enters the marketplace and considers the purchase of specific items, he
asks himself, either consciously or unconsciously, whether the price he must
pay is "worth it," or in economic terms, whether the expected utility or
benefit to be derived from the purchase is great enough to justify the con-
sumption in lieu of saving or purchasing elsewhere. In an investment decision
involving the purchase of credit, the value of the use of money must be con-
sidered and the expected benefit or utility must be discounted by the various
risks faced by the consumer. The consumer is able to discount his expected
utility only after he accurately estimates the risks involved.
But several factors prevent this model of marketplace behavior from
operating to provide consumers with their expected utility from the purchase
or investment. The most important obstacle is the lack of perfect information
about prices, conditions and terms of the transaction. When the decision-
maker has less than perfect information upon which to base his choice of
alternatives, the principles of decision theory5" call for him to bring whatever
information he does have to bear upon the decision problem. Although fully
aware that the information he has may be erroneous or incomplete, the ra-
tional decision-maker has no real choice but to attempt to overcome the in-
formation gap by using the best available information and knowledge to
make the decision.
A simple model catergorizing the degrees of knowledge 8 is useful for il-
lustrating the significant impact on decision-making that acceleration clause
disclosure represents. There are two types of knowledge: perfect knowledge,
characterized by the ability to accurately predict the outcome from a par-
ticular event or occurrence, and imperfect knowledge, characterized by a lack
of such ability. Imperfect knowledge may be further divided into three
degrees. "Risk" is the class of events wherein all possible outcomes are
known, with each outcome having determinable objective probabilities. One
"For an in-depth discussion of these basic principles of economic theory, see A. THOMPSON.
EcONOMICS OF THE FIRM (1973).
"See id. at 36-70.
61d. at 39 & n.1.
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such event is the toss of a coin; only two outcomes are possible, and the pro-
babilities of each can be determined statistically by use of a frequency distribu-
tion. The second degree of imperfect knowledge is "uncertainty." This is a
class of events wherein all possible outcomes are known, but the probabilities
of each are unknown. When one possesses only uncertain knowledge he
assigns subjective probabilities, that is, his individual estimate of the pro-
babilities, to the various outcomes. Finally, the third degree of imperfect
knowledge is "ignorance." Within this class of events, the possible outcomes
are unknown as are, a fortiori, the probabilities of those outcomes. Within
the context of this model, acceleration clause disclosure takes the consumer
out of "ignorance," where he is totally unaware of the possible outcomes of
late payment, and gives him "uncertain" information, where he is made
aware of the possible outcome, the creditor's option to exercise his right of
acceleration, when the event of late payment occurs. Acceleration disclosure
thereby enables the consumer to at least subjectively evaluate the probability
of this possible outcome.5 7
Economic models assume that the consumer acts rationally, that he is
able to deal on equal terms with the business community, and that he seeks
to maximize his utility. 8 It is assumed that the consumer, when estimating
the satisfaction that he will obtain from a product or service, will consider the
risks involved and thereby discount his expected utility. For the most part,
however, consumers are unware of the risks of acceleration, and economic ac-
tivity without awareness of legal liabilities is inconsistent with efficient func-
tioning of a modified market, the ability of which to provide desired products
and services at lowest cost is dependent on the asserted informed choices of
consumers.5 9 If consumers are unaware of the risk that the acceleration clause
represents, the cost of credit will inaccurately reflect the true price of its use.
As discussed earlier, price movements signal producers to alter the composi-
tion of their output; it is therefore logical to conclude that, upon being in-
formed of the risks, the consumer would demand less credit and resource
allocation would be optimized as a result.
An algebraic cost of credit equation that is relevant to the pursuit of op-
timal resource allocation 60 can be appropriately applied to acceleration clause
disclosure. The employment of this method of analysis reveals that, disclosure
of acceleration will appreciably promote informed investment decision-
making.
'?"Uncertainty and subjective risk characterize the environment in which most decisions are
made." Therefore, the process of reaching decisions when the knowledge level is below objective
risk is most relevant. Id. at 41.581d. at 93-97.
"See text accompanying note 55 supra.
6°See generally Schwartz, supra note 27. See also Schwartz, Cure and Revocation For
Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains, 16 B. C. INDus. AND CoM. L. REv. 543 (1975). The cost
of credit analysis incorporates an estimation of the probabilities of outcomes inquiry introduced
earlier. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
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For each credit transaction, let C represent the cost to the consumer of
the losses he will incur if he is unable to keep up with his installment
payments. 61 Let p represent the probability that cost C will be incurred, that
is, that the borrower will in fact be late in payment.6 2 The product, pC, e-
quals the risk, R, which a borrower undertakes in the credit transaction. The
value of this risk, R, represents the amount by which the actual credit cost to
the consumer exceeds his perceived cost of that credit. 63 When a consumer
misvalues the cost, C, that he could incur because he is unaware of the conse-
quences of late payment, he will have erred also in his estimte of p, the sub-
jective probabilities. The result is that the value of R may be totally
misleading. As discussed earlier, it is necessary that consumers have the abili-
ty to value the risks when asserting a preference; if they cannot value the risks
created by late payment, the cost of credit will be distorted because the stated
price will inaccurately reflect the relevant costs. Specifically, when the con-
sumer misvalues R, the risk of acceleration when using credit, credit at a par-
ticular price appears to be a better buy than if the consumer had correct in-
formation as to the risk. Since demand is a function of the consumer's
estimate of true cost, 6' when risk is underestimated, the entire demand
schedule66 is overstated.66 A riskier credit than consumers originally perceived
represents a different product, 67 and the greater demand for credit results in
a higher price. 6
Moreover, under these circumstances, producers are using more capital to
finance credit purchases than they would if their true costs were perceived.
The higher equilibrium price has signaled creditors to supply an inordinate
amount of a vital resource, capital, for the consumer credit industry.6 9 This
capital could be better used in many other areas of the economy, but because
of the overstated price, capital is attracted to the credit industry and does not
flow to those other areas for more efficient use. Thus, optimal resource
"
1These losses are uncertain, as the creditor has numerous legal remedies, but these
remedies pose potential borrower liabilities that represent a large burden should payments be
made late.
"
5The consumer may be late in payment because of mismanagement of money, illness,
unexpected unemployment, or by a miscalculated choice when he is unaware of the consequences
of non-payment.
6SSee generally Schwartz, stupra note 27.4Quantity demanded is the demand for goods or services at a certain price; demand is a
series of relationships. See note 65 infra.6 Demand is represented by a demand schedule, a curve representing the amounts of a pro-
duct or service that consumers are willing and able to buy at a set of given prices.
'
6 The demand curve is further north-east than if consumers had correct information.
'
5Therefore, if consumers were using accurate risk information, the demand curve would
be further south-west.
"Quantity demanded and price have an inverse relationship. However, we are not con-
cerned with movements along the demand schedules; rather, we are comparing two demand
schedules that represent informed demand and uninformed demand.
"eBecause of the higher price, the extenders of credit are supplied with more money to
compete for capital for use in the consumer credit market.
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allocation, the microeconomic goal of credit information disclosure for the in-
vestment decision, would be furthered by disclosure of the acceleration right.
The economic model also indicates that acceleration disclosure would,
operate to optimize individual welfare. AsSuming again that the consumer
seeks to obtain the maximum satisfaction from his money income, his pro-
blem is to select, from among all of the various possible commodities, that
particular combination of commodities which he perceives to be most satisfac-
tory from his economic standpoint. When the consumer misperceives the
costs, C, of the purchase of credit, and as a result, the risk R is inaccurate,
the use of credit appears to be a more desirable commodity than it is in ac-
tuality; as a result, the consumer uses more credit than he would if accurately
informed of the acceleration risk, because he has not discounted his expected
utility by the value of the acceleration risk. This means that the consumer's
particular combination of commodities, or shopping basket, including an
overuse of credit, will not give him the maximum utility for his money
because he has substituted the use of credit in his basket for some other good
or service. When informed, the consumer would use less credit, substitute in
his basket a service or product with a marginal utility greater than credit,
and thereby increase his overall welfare.
In addition to capital being optimally allocated, and individual welfare
being optimized, a wealth transfer from informed consumers to uninformed
consumers could be eliminated by acceleration clause disclosure. Since most
consumers are uninformed with respect to acceleration the demand is
overstated and the price is artifically high. Consumers informed of the risk
the acceleration provision poses have to pay a higher market price than the
use of credit is worth. If all consumers were uninformed, the demand would
be further overstated, and the price still higher. In this connection, there are
three relevant demand schedules, and their respective prices for credit: D,
and P1 , where all consumers are uninformed; D2 and P2, where most con-
sumers are uninformed; and D3 and P3 , where all consumers are informed of
the acceleration risk. P1 is greater than P2 and the difference between P1, where
all consumers are uninformed, and P2, where most consumers are uninform-
ed, represents the amount of wealth transferred from the informed consumers
to the uninformed. The uninformed consumers pay a smaller price because
the informed consumers exercise restraint in their use of credit, thereby keep-
ing the price lower, at P2. If the informed consumers did not exercise this
restraint, the uninformed would be paying the higher price. Therefore,
there is a wealth transfer that could be eliminated by the disclosure
of the acceleration clause; the informed consumers would no longer be
forced to pay the higher price caused by the overuse of credit on the part
of uninformed consumers. With all consumers informed with respect to
disclosure, the market price of credit would fall to P3 due to the decreased
demand.
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The decrease in price to the consumer which would result from disclosure
must be greater than the increase in price due to the increased administrative
cost incurred by the creditor and passed on to the consumer; otherwise no net
gain for the consumer would result. The creditor must change his disclosure
statement to include the right of acceleration, and this increased overhead
cost could create a new supply schedule which would include a higher price.
The creditor must only add two or three lines to his disclosure statement,
however, and this cost is minimal when compared to his total servicing and
overhead costs. Moreover, the new reform and simplification bills pending in
Congress are evidence that other changes in disclosure requirements are im-
minent. Since the new law will require changes in the disclosure statement,
an additional change with respect to acceleration disclosure would not add
any appreciable costs.
Economic theory thus indicates that disclosure of acceleration clause in-
formation will promote optimal resource allocation, maximize individual
welfare and eliminate a current wealth transfer among consumers, and is
therefore consistent with the second policy of TIL of promoting informed in-
vestment decisions. Whether these consequences will actually result from
disclosure is a function of the accuracy of economic assumptions concerning
consumer behavior. The issue is whether consumers do seek to maximize their
utility and, more specifically, whether consumers, when making purchase
decisions, will care enough about the acceleration clause to appreciate the
risk it entails. Since no evidence is available on the effect of acceleration
clause disclosure, a determination of whether consumers will evaluate this risk
cannot be empirically verified. It may be argued that consumers do not con-
sider the possibility of default, and that therefore they will ignore the risk
that the creditor's acceleration right presents. However, this line of reasoning
assumes that consumers cannot sensibly judge their own interests; even if this
assumption is true, it is entirely inconsistent with the accepted assumptions
concerning human behavior which are embodied in our legal and economic
systems, and therefore should not be accepted unless it is empirically
verified.7 0 Buyers should not be kept ignorant of the true cost of consumer
credit on the belief that they will act imprudently when informed.
INCREASING CONSUMER AWARENESS
The third policy of the TIL Act is the broad concern for consumer
education that overlaps the first and second policies of encouraging com-
parative shopping and promoting informed investment decisions. The need
70See generally Schwartz, supra note 27, at 503. "It is inconsistent to say that a statute that
is designed to facilitate shopping ought to be construed on the assumption that shopping does not
take place. . ." Landers, supra note 29, at 92. This reasoning appears to logically extend to the
situation presented.
[Vol. 53:97
1977-1978] ACCELERATION CLAUSE DISCLOSURE 109
for increased consumer awareness appears to be a theme that underlies all
consumer protection legislation. The reasons for this need in credit transac-
tions lies in the history of abusive practices by creditors" and in the outright
neglect of consumer problems by many state legislatures.7 2
The phenomenal growth of installment credit has been an aid to decep-
tive and fraudulent marketing. 73 When consumer transactions depended on
cash, sellers had less opportunity for fraud. In an installment credit transac-
tion, whether the consumer can afford the purchase is less relevant for some
creditors because, once the contract is made, the seller can pursue his legal
right to collect. 74 Deception is not the only source of dysfunction in the con-
sumer credit industry; the failure of the law to change with the industry is
another major problem. 7s Laws regulating consumer credit in most states are
borrowed from commercial law.7 6 Commercial law is based upon the assump-
tion that parties have equal sophistication, i.e., that they both fully under-
stand all the rights and liabilities of the various contract provisions. However,
the consumer has little experience with or understanding of contractual rela-
tionships. Further, the consumer credit transaction uses an adhesion contract
prepared by the financier; in most cases the consumer neither receives nor
reads the contract before signing. The thrust of much consumer legislation is
to inform in an effort to reduce the inequality between creditor and con-
sumer.
The disclosure of the acceleration clause is particularly important because
the acceleration right can be easily abused. In the event of non-payment after
the grace period has run, the creditor has the legal right to take self-
protective action. 77 Creditors may provide in their contracts that a debt may
7'Boyd, The Revised Uniform Consumer Credit Code As a Replacement For Piecemeal
Consumer Legislation: The Arizona Context, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Boyd]; D. CAPLoVITz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, 37-46 (1974). See also Alderman, supra note 35;
Note, Due Process Denied: Consumer DefaultJudgments in New York City, 10 COLUM. J. L. AND
SOC. PROB. 570 (1974).
"See Boyd, supra note 71; NCCF Report, supra note 52, at 3.
"sConsumer credit has expanded in use tremendously, from 10% of disposable income and
$21.5 billion in 1950 to 18% of disposable income and $184.3 billion in 1975; $151.5 billion of
the 1975 figure represented installment credit. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 475
(1975). One of the most disturbing aspects of consumer borrowing is the growing length of some
loans. Since 1975, the average length for personal loans has risen about five months to nearly
forty-one months. New and used cars, mobile homes, appliances and furniture all are being
financed by longer term loans. At the same time, borrowers are generally having to pay down
less on their purchases. A Federal Reserve Board economist also voiced concern that "the trend
toward longer maturities and lower down payments makes the typical loan riskier. It makes the
loan much more vulnerable if the economy should begin to turn sour." The fear is that if
another recession should develop, loan delinquencies could be a major economic problem as
many consumers are deeply in debt. Malambre, Borrowing Boom, Wall St. J., June 28, 1977, at
1, col. 8.
"See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE (1974).
751d. at 2.
761d. at ix & 2.
7"U.C.C. § 9-501 (1972).
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be accelerated if the creditor feels "insecure"; 78 the only limit on this ability
to accelerate is that the creditor must act in good faith. 79 However, this is not
a significant limitation as good faith only requires that the creditor act
honestly in fact.80 Moreover, the burden of proving bad faith is on the deb-
tor."' This allows a creditor great freedom and power.8 2 By "hair-trigger" ac-
celeration, the creditor is able to force debtors into default or refinancing of
the debt.8s
Acceleration clause disclosure would also alert consumers that they might
need credit insurance. The risk of incapacity to meet installment obligations
is reduced by credit life insurance, credit accident and health insurance, and
property and liability insurance. Credit accident and health insurance, for in-
stance, is designed to maintain the consumer's installment payments if he
becomes sick or disabled during the payment period.8' By opting for credit
insurance in a large loan or credit purchase transaction, the consumer can
reduce the risk of having payments accelerated during periods of illness,
disability or death.
In most default cases the consumer simply misjudges his ability to
manage credit obligations. 8 Acceleration disclosure, as suggested, alerts the
consumer to the significant risk of using credit. By increasing the awareness
of the risks involved, disclosure also discourages the consumer from commit-
ting himself to an overextended credit position. This is desirable both for the
consumer's welfare and for stabilization of the economy. 8 The knowledge
that the entire balance may be demanded if one installment is late also pro-
vides an additional incentive to meet the single payment for consumers who
78U.C.C. § 1-208 (1972); NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 24.
"U.C.C. § 1-208 (1972); Boyd, supra note 71, at 28; NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 24.80U.C.C. § 1-201(19), 1-203 & Comment (1972); Boyd, supra note 71, at 28 & n.236.
81U.C.C. § 1-208 (1972); Boyd, supra note 71, at 28.
82NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 25; Boyd, supra note 71, at 28.
"The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) does eliminate much of the danger of this
practice. Under the UCCC, the "insecurity" basis for acceleration is allowed to the extent that
the prospect of payment, performance, or realization of collateral is significantly impaired, and
the creditor has the burden of proving that the impairment is substantial. U.C.C.C. § 5.109(2) &
Comment Z; Boyd, supra note 71, at 29. However, to the extent that the UCCC has not been
adopted, and to the extent that it is not effective in eliminating the potential for creditor abuse
of acceleration clauses, the possibility of such abuse still exists. Informing the consumer on the
disclosure statement is an aid to the over-all scheme of eliminating the harshness of acceleration
by making the consumer aware of the acceleration right and how it is triggered.
"8Landers, supra note 29, at 113. Consumer credit insurance is highly criticized as being
over-priced, forced on consumers as a condition of the credit transaction, misrepresented, fre-
quently the subject of fraudulent and deceptive practices or sold in excessive amounts or without
provision for rebate in event of prepayment or refinancing. Id. at 114. However, credit in-
surance, if properly controlled by insurance statutes or regulations, could be a very useful and
beneficial risk reducer, which could eliminate the harshness of acceleration in many instances.
85NCCF Report, supra note 32, at 193. This statement does not conflict with subsequent
discussion, see text accompanying notes 86-90 infra. Mismanagement here includes those situa-
tions where the consumer fails to allow enough slack to absorb short-term fluctuations in income.
"See NCCF Report, supra note 36, at 174.
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were not aware of the consequences of non-payment. The TIL Act seeks to
increase the general awareness of consumers, and the goal is that disclosure
information will cause consumers to act more prudently when using credit.
Disclosure of the acceleration clause furthers this goal by making this infor-
mation more prominent and understandable. If standardized language were
used for acceleration clause provisions, 7 the consumer's reading of the same
clause in each disclosure statement for each transaction would reinforce its
prominence on the statement and would increase consumers' general
awareness of the acceleration risk.
A primary argument against disclosure is the sheer complexity of the TIL
statement. 88 Originally intended to be a simple statute for the disclosure of
finance charges and interest rates, the TIL Act has resulted in statements
that frequently comprise a full page or more of small print. This detailed
statement hardly seems beneficial to consumers, and any simplification that
cuts down on disclosures without impairing the basic operation of the statute
would be desirable.89 Indeed, this seems to be the trust of the current
simplification bills in Congress." ° It is likely that increasing the items of
disclosure leads confused consumers- to ignore the statement entirely since
they feel incapable of comparing all the disclosed information, so that
disclosure of a few key items may be more helpful than disclosure of all the
relevant data.
The FRB, in a statement before the Consumer Affairs Subcommitte of
the Senate Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, has recom-
mended improvement in the delivery of information to consumers by em-
phasizing the most significant disclosures and clearing up ambiguities.91 This
proposal would reduce required disclosures to basic finance charge and cost
information.92 In addition, the FRB recommends that certain important
terms be disclosed-those which are less directly related to cost, and more
related to the consumer's rights on default or prepayment,93 i.e., that a sum-
mary statement with respect to late payment charges, security interests and
prepayment penalties be made along with a reference to the actual contract
for details.94 The FRB finally recommends a general reference to the contract
for provisions dealing with the consequences of default. 98
"This is not to suggest standardizing the instances that trigger the creditor's right to ac-
celeration, which is the subject of state statutes.
"See generally Landers, supra note 29, at 92-93.
9id.
19See notes 24-26 supra & text accompanying.
'Statement by Philip C. Jackson, Jr., Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, United States Senate, July 11, 1977, at 2.
: Id.
sId.
4id.
:5Id. at 3.
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Complete disclosure of these terms in detail is legalistic and of little value
to consumers in that form. However, a summary of terms is insufficiently in-
formative. The FRB recommendation is an intermediate position that will
simplify the disclosure statement without sacrificing pertinent information.96
By a general reference to the acceleration right -plus a cross-reference to the
contract for further details, the consumer is put on notice of default conse-
quences and can review the terms of the contract for a full explanation.9 7
CONCLUSION
Disclosure of the creditor's right of acceleration accompanied by a cross-
reference to the credit contract for detailed explanation of default conse-
quences should be required by the Truth In Lending Act. Economic analysis
indicates that this disclosure would be useful in furthering the policies of the
Act. Consumers informed of the risk' acceleration represents will seek creditors
that do not include the clause in the credit contract, and informed consumers
will discount the expected utility of credit by the risk represented by the in-
clusion of the acceleration clause in the credit contract, thereby allowing the
market to approach the optimum with respect to the allocation of capital. By
making informed investment decisions, a wealth transfer from debtors in-
formed of the acceleration risk to those uninformed will be eliminated. Fur-
ther, individual welfare will be maximized by an informed purchase of credit.
Finally, the presence of the acceleration clause by reference to the contract,
signals to the debtor that he should read that document and become familiar
with this common yet complex consumer transaction.
PATRICK E. HOOG
"The FRB proposal is to give brief explanations in everyday language of the recommended
limited number of disclosure terms. Id. at 5.
97The following is an example of the proposed disclosed acceleration clause, cross-
referencing the debtor to the credit contract. On the FRB proposed simplified disclosure state-
ment this clause would be on the bottom of the page just above the debtor's signature which in-
dicates he has received and read the disclosure statement:
You should read your contract for other information including our right to declare the
full balance due in the event of nonpayment or other default, and prepayment rebates
and penalties.
Statement by Philip C. Jackson, Jr., supra note 85, Appendix C.
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